Explaining Variations in the Price of Dairy Quota: Flow Returns, Liquidity, Quota Characteristics, and Policy Risk by Wilson, Norbert L.W. & Sumner, Daniel A.
Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 29(1):  1-16 
Copyright 2004 Western Agricultural Economics Association 
Explaining Variations in the Price 
of Dairy Quota: Flow Returns, Liquidity, 
Quota Characteristics, and Policy Risk 
Norbert L. W. Wilson and Daniel A. Sumner 
An econometric model based on the net present value model is used to examine factors 
that drive the variation of  California dairy quota values over a 29-year period. The 
results suggest the price of  quota is based on expected returns, variations in quota 
owner liquidity, and the risk of policy default. The dominant influence on the variation 
of  the quota price was the historical variation in monthly flow of net benefits from 
owning quota. This analysis cobs  that the rate of return to quota rises in periods 
of policy uncertainty. 
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Introduction 
The expected value of policy benefits is capitalized into the asset prices of inelastically 
supplied resources. This basic principle is well accepted, but the capitalization rate has 
been particularly hard to measure for assets created by agricultural policies for several 
reasons: policies are complex and change over time, non-policy factors typically affect 
the value of farm assets associated with policy, and sufficient market data measuring 
farm asset prices are often not available. 
Understanding how policy benefits are capitalized into agricultural assets is  vital to 
assessing how policy affects welfare. Land has received most of  the attention in the 
literature about capitalization into farm assets (Alston, 1986; Lence and Miller, 1999). 
For example, researchers have determined that part of the capital value of some farm 
policy benefits is included in farmland values (Duffy et al., 1994; Clark, Klein, and 
Thompson, 1993;  and Seagraves, 1969, among others). However, because farmland 
markets are complex with multiple influences, researchers have found it difficult to 
measure the contribution of farm policy to farmland prices. 
Other farm assets are actually created by farm policy itself. Unlike land and other 
capital assets such as animals,  tractors, etc., policy-created assets exist solely at  the  will 
of the government. Another distinguishing feature of policy-created assets is that these 
assets seem to exhibit relatively high rates of return relative to alternative investments 
(e.g., Barichello and Chen, 1996; Chen and Meilke, 1998; Johnson, 1991; Lermer and 
Stanbury, 1985;  Moschini and  Meilke, 1988;  Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1996; Sumner, 1988; Sumner and Alston, 1984). 
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This analysis uses monthly data from a unique market for a farm policy-created asset 
to describe how program characteristics and policy events affect asset prices over a 29- 
year study period, 1970-1998. The rate of return to ownership of  California dairy quota, 
about 27% per annum (the ratio of  the sum of  flow revenue earned plus capital gains 
relative to the quota price),  has been substantially higher than the rate of return for stock 
market indices of  8.4% (return of  the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted market 
index) (Sumner and Wilson, 2000b). 
Our data allow us to observe quota asset prices directly and to examine the influence 
of policy more directly and over a longer period than has been possible in previous studies. 
An econometric model based on simple net present value ideas is used to examine factors 
that drive the variation of quota values over time. Our results suggest the price of  quota 
is based on expected returns, variations in quota owner liquidity, and the risk of  policy 
default. 
Literature on Quota Returns 
Several studies have examined the movement of  quota prices conceptually and empir- 
ically (e.g., Alston, 1992; Arcus, 1978; Barichello, 1996; Hubbard, 1992; Johnson, 1991; 
Seagraves, 1969; Veeman and Dong, 1995). In his 1969 study of flue-cured tobacco 
acreage allotments, Seagraves used data on farmland prices and found that the ratio of 
the estimated value of  the flow return to the asset value of  tobacco allotment fell over 
the 20 years of  the data set. Seagraves interpreted the decline as increased confidence 
in the allotment program-a  decline in the risk of  policy default. 
Veeman and Dong (1995)  used a first-order adaptive expectations  model to estimate 
parameters of the variables potentially affecting the deflated price of  fluid milk quota 
in Ontario for the period August 1984 through July 1993. They included a dummy 
variable representing the period of  hearings by the Canadian Parliament's Committee 
on Agriculture. The hearings concerned an adverse GATT ruling about Canadian dairy 
policy. The coefficient on the dummy variable was negative and statistically significant. 
Barichello and Chen (1996) estimated sets of  regression models to explain the price 
of quota in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta. They defined a dummy variable for the periods 
of  trade negotiations. In most cases, the dummy variable for default risk was negative 
and statistically significant. 
The work reported here builds on the literature cited above, investigating the case of 
California dairy quota. We  have an advantage of  much cleaner and richer data than 
previous studies because it  was not necessary to derive the average quota prices and the 
monthly flow return for quota. Thus, we are able to avoid some of  the empirical problems 
faced by previous researchers. 
The Basic Operation of the Milk Price 
and Quota Program in California 
The principal features of  the California milk marketing order system are (a)  classified 
pricing, which sets minimum prices paid based on the end-use of  the milk; (b)  price 
pooling, under which farmers are paid a weighted average of  the prices paid for milk by 
end-use; and (c)  the pool quota program, which determines the pool price paid to each 
farmer based on the amount of quota the farmer owns relative to the amount of  milk Wilson and Sumner  Policy Risk in Dairy Quota  3 
marketed. The specifics of the  policy have changed from time to time, but these features 
have remained. 
The law requires that the Director of the California Department of Food and Agri- 
culture (CDFA) issues Stabilization and Marketing Plans for Market Milk. While the 
law provides a framework for the pooling policies, the substance of the law is in the 
pooling plans (Calif: Food & Agr. Code, 1998,s  62700-62731). 
Milk Price Policy Overview 
California establishes  five distinct minimum price classes based on milk end-use. Mini- 
mum prices for each end-use class of milk are  set as  follows: Class 1  (C,) applies to milk 
or cream sold for fluid use (it is generally the highest-priced class); Class 2 (C,) applies 
to milk used for sour cream, yogurt, and cottage cheese; Class 3 (C,) applies to  milk used 
for the manufacture of frozen dairy products; Class 4a (C,,)  applies to milk used for 
butter, milk solids, and dry mi&,  and Class 4b (C,,)  applies to milk used for hard cheeses 
(Calif: Food & Agr. Code, 1998,s  61932-61935).  The total quantity of milk demanded 
(or total consumption, C) is the sum of milk used in each class: 
The price for each class actually received by farmers is the maximum of either the 
market clearing price or the  minimum class price. Producers also may  receive premiums 
over the minimum price directly from distributors. Such payments are outside of the 
pool. Premiums reflect quality factors such as  higher fat  content. Assume the  minimum 
prices paid into the  pool are Ply  P,, P,, P,,,  and P,,.  The current method for determining 
prices Ply  P,, P,,  P,,,  and P,,  relies on formulae which relate the prices of milk in each 
class to state and national market prices and other data. The CDFA has changed the 
formulae periodically. 
The CDFA uses formulae and public hearings to establish minimum prices for each 
milk class. As with federal orders, the  California order calculates blend prices based on 
marketwide use of milk by class. Unlike federal orders, where all producers in an  order 
receive the same blend price (subject to quality and transportation cost differentials), 
the monthly blend price received by California producers depends on the quantity of 
quota the producer holds relative to the total quantity of  milk the producer markets 
during the month. 
Pool Revenue 
Aggregate milk production may be written as  M = &Mi,  where Mi is the production of 
producer i. Let total production equal total consumption (C = M). Pool revenue (R) to 
producers can be calculated as fo1lows:l 
'  Because multiple components (snf and fat for each class and the fluid carrier for Class 1) are the basis of the minimum 
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The quota program has no direct role in setting milk prices by end-use or in allocating 
milk among classes. The quota program applies to the dispersal of  pool revenue. Quota 
ownership varies across farms, and the revenue of  an individual farm depends on the 
amount of  quota the farm owns. 
Quota Milk Prices Prior to 1994 
Before 1994, the price of quota milk (P,) was the weighted average of  the prices of  higher- 
priced end-use classes of  milk. The price of  overbase or non-quota milk (P,) was the 
weighted average of  the prices of  lower-priced end-use classes of  milk. Therefore, the 
flow return to quota ownership was f = P,  - P,,  where f is the quota flow return. 
The cut-off point determining  the share of the intermediate classes  used in calculating 
P,  or P,  depended on the aggregate quantity of  quota relative to the quantity of milk sold 
in that month. In addition, the class weights varied monthly, depending on milk sales. 
Milk prices P,  and P,, each varied because the underlying class prices and weights varied. 
In sum, the flow return, f,  the return to quota, varied because of  variation in (a)  milk 
sales by class, (b)  amount of  quota, and (c) class prices. 
Quota Milk Prices After 1994 
Since 1994, state law has fixed the flow return per unit of quota. Under the system, the 
first step in dispersing pool revenue to quota owners is to allocate daily $0.195 .per 
pound of  solids not fat (snf) for each pound of quota owned. No assignment is made for 
fat. This dispersal is also defined as $1.70 per hundredweight of  milk quota daily (8.7 
pounds snfper hundredweight milk times $0.195 per pound snf). For the aggregate quota 
quantity Q (in  hundredweight of milk),  the total revenue assigned to all quota is $1.70Q, 
and the quota revenue for an individual is $1.70Qi,  where Qi varies from zero (for about 
20% of  producers) up to total milk output (for less than 5% of  producers in any month). 
The CDFA disperses the rest of  the milk pool revenue (R,), 
according to milk production. The average per unit pool price paid for milk is Pn  =  R,IM, 
where P,  is the non-quota or overbase milk price. Therefore, each producer receives a 
portion of the pool revenue depending on the total milk marketing of the producer (Mi). 
The quota milk price (P,)  is the sum of  the $1.70 dispersal and the overbase price, i.e., 
P,  = $1.70 + P,, per hundredweight milk. Total revenue for producer i (R,) is simply 
equal to 
Sumner and Wolf (1996) showed that under these conditions quota did not affect mar- 
ginal production decisions. 
Quota Market Regulations 
Quota can be bought or sold, but it cannot be rented. Several rules limit full liquidity. 
Once purchased, a producer cannot sell quota for two years, except in cases of hardship Wilson and Sumner  Policy Risk in Daily Quota  5 
(fire, flood, and storms, for example). A producer cannot buy back quota for two years 
after selling quota. Further, a producer who receives "new" quota from the CDFA or 
purchases quota from a hardship case cannot sell quota for five years. The provisions 
of the quota program do not state a minimum quantity of milk a producer must supply 
or a maximum a producer may produce or supply. The State  of California cannot use the 
pooling plan (thus the quota) to limit the amount of milk a farmer can market (Calif. 
Food & Agr. Code, 1998, $62721). 
The CDFA has  allocated new quota intermittently following a formula, which has 
changed occasionally. Generally, the CDFA has created new quota in proportion to the 
increase in the quantity of Class 1  use. In 1978, the State broke from this basic policy 
by creatingnew quota without consideration of Class 1  sales (Boynton, 1996).  Given flat, 
Class 1  milk sales in California, the last dispersal of new quota was in 1992. 
Economic Considerations in Specifying 
the Model for Quota Prices 
A net present value model of expected flow returns is used to specify the price of 
quota. That is, Quota Price, at  time t is  the sum of expected (at  time t)  flow return 
to quota E,  Lft+,l  from t +  n, where n = 0,  until the end of the time horizon, t +N,  divided 
by a discount factor which depends on an expected discount rate that varies over time, 
E, kt+,  I : 
Et[ft+,]  Quota Price, = 
n=o (1  + E, [rt+nl)n 
If one assumes the expected flow return and the expected discount rate are fxed over 
an infinite time horizon, then the model simplifies to the following: 
E, [f  I  Quota Price, = -  . 
E, [rl 
Therefore, in the simplified model, the  price of quota is simply a function of the expected 
flow return and the expected discount rate of the quota. 
Variables Affecting the Price of  Quota 
We divide the variables affecting the price of  quota into four categories. Specifically, 
(a)  the expected return associated with quota investments is related to current and past 
observations of flow return; (b)  units of California milk quota have specific charac- 
teristics that  vary and affect the current and expected flow return; (c) the expected 
discount rate applicable to quota investment in any period is a function of credit 
availability or liquidity in the dairy industry; and (d)  policy events also can affect (i)  the 
expected discount rate, (ii) the time horizon, or (iii) the size of the expected flow return, 
E,  If,,].  As detailed in the discussion below, the model specification provides a frame- 
work for understanding the influence of these categories of independent variables on 
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Flow Return 
Notes: Figure 1  data are from various issues of  the California Dairy Information Bulletin (CDFA, Dairy 
Marketing and Milk Pooling Branch) and other State  documents; the price deflator is  from annual issues of 
Agricultural Prices:  Annual Summary (USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Senice). In October 1989, 
Flow Return fell to -0.299  $/lb. snf; in November 1989,  Flow Return fell to -3.195  $/lb. snf. 
Figure 1. Quota  Price- the deflated average monthly price of 
California dairy quota; and FZow Return- the deflated monthly 
per unit net return of owning California dairy quota (1970-1998) 
Data on the  Flow Return represent the monthly cash receipts from owning quota (see 
figure 1).  The Flow Return is the deflated, monthly difference between the hundred- 
weight quota and overbase milk prices. To capture the returns to the multiple compo- 
nents of milk (described below) and make the return a monthly return, we divided by 
8.7 to adjust to dollars per snf prices for compatibility with the price of  quota, and 
then multiplied by the number of  days in the month. The net present value model 
states that the price of quota is a function of  expected flow return, but expectations 
of the FZow Return are not obse~able.  We use an adaptive expectations (AE) model 
to incorporate expectations into the econometric model. Flow Return is hypothesized 
to have a positive effect on the quota price. 
A measure of  cash flow, Liquidity, affects the market for quota to the extent that 
credit constraints or an upward-sloping supply of  capital affects dairy producers. In 
times of financial stress for dairy farms, the supply of  quota on the market will rise 
and the demand for quota will fall, causing a fall in the price of  quota.2  Liquidity is 
the deflated, monthly difference  between the hundredweight overbase milk price and 
the statewide, weighted cost of production, divided by 8.7.  Notice, Liquidity does not 
reflect expectations about future dairy profits; rather, Liquidity reflects the effects of 
Some quota brokers and dairy farm accountants have argued that quota is the most liquid asset a California dairy pro- 
ducer owns. Therefore, in times of financial diaculty,  quota is often the first asset sold. Wilson and Sumner  Policy Risk in Dairy Quota  7 
short-run credit and liquidity constraints on quota price as  well as the legal restriction 
that only California dairy producers may hold quota. Thus, the effect of Liquidity on 
the price of quota is hypothesized to be positive. 
Each unit of  quota traded is not homogeneous because of the multiple components 
(snf and fat) and the historical allocation. Quota is traded in units of  solids not fat 
(snf). The CDFA allocated to each pound of quota snf specific amounts of  quota fat, 
base snf, and base fat. To understand this allocation,  one needs to recognize the histor- 
ical allocations. Initially, the State  gave quota in accordance to the quantity of Class 
1  (fluid milk) contracts a producer possessed. However, a producer typically produced 
more milk than hisfher Class 1  contract, so base was allocated to cover historical 
production beyond quota. Any milk produced beyond base is  called overbase milk. The 
quota and base snf and fat distribution was founded on the farms' historical produc- 
tion of fats and snf (Sumner and Wilson, 2000a). The composition of quota (in terms 
of fat and snf) affects the income generated from a unit of quota. Thus, the quota fat 
to quota snf ratio (Fatlsnf  affects the expected future flow return, and consequently 
the price of  quota in snf units. The monthly return to owning quota fat (Quota Fat 
Milk Price less Overbase Fat  Milk Price in dollars per pound of fat)  has usually been 
positive, but it was more than occasionally negative in the first two decades of the 
program's history. The mean flow return to quota fat  was slightly positive but smaller 
than the return to snf; therefore, it is hypothesized that Fatlsnf affects quota asset 
price negatively. Finally, ownership of base has two effects on the return to quota. 
First, for many years, the CDFA set a price premium for base milk relative to non- 
quota or overbase milk. Second, a higher ratio of base-to-quota increases the eligibil- 
ity of producers to receive new quota; thus, BaselQuota is expected to have a positive 
effect on the price of quota. 
We interviewed dairy producers (and others related to the California dairy industry) 
about the  policy shifts or proposed policy shifts that affected their expectations of the 
future. No consensus developed on any individual policy events (Wilson, 1999).  How- 
ever, we selected five (out of  at least 139) policy events that represent the most 
significant changes in federal or state dairy policies which might have affected 
expectations about the future of the quota program. Those policy events are used as 
the basis for five dummy variables. The variables reflect potential changes in expec- 
tations about the future flow return from the quota program. Start and end dates of 
policy events are difficult to determine because the timing of information dispersals 
and expectation formation are not known. Start and end dates are selected 
corresponding to the actual start and end dates (if such dates exist) of the policies. 
Implicitly, we assume the effect of policy uncertainty is not permanent because the 
end occurs before the end of  the data set.3 In cases where the dates are not clearly 
defined, we define a priori the time we believe incorporates the entire effect of the 
policy change. The policy event variables capture direct and indirect effects of  the 
policies on the value of  quota. We also model producers' expectations of the policy 
events. An adaptive expectations model is used that covers all of the variables, thereby 
capturing some of the producer expectations of changes of policies. The five variables 
reflecting policy events are dummy variables and are defined as  follows: 
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Rising Price Support. This variable equals one for the months January 1974  through 
December 1981,  and zero otherwise. During this period, the U.S. Department of Agri- 
culture  made frequent nominal adjustments to the federal price support for manufac- 
tured milk products. No other period since the creation of the quota program had such 
rapid changes (either positive or negative). These changes suggested uncertainty in 
federal policy, which left California producers uncertain of their relatively new quota 
program. Thus, the shift  in policy would have had a negative impact on the quota 
price, and we hypothesize a negative coefficient on Rising Price Support. 
Equalization Shock. In July 1978, the California Legislature passed a law equal- 
izing all producers. Specifically, the California Legislature gave, without regard to 
Class 1  sales, quota to producers so that each producer had 95% of production base 
covered by quota. Under the Gonsalves Act of 1967,  equalization was to occur through 
growth in Class 1  sales. The fact that new legislation was required might have made 
producers apprehensive about the possibility of additional unknown changes (Wilson, 
1999).  Therefore,  Equalization Shock-which  equals one for July 1978  through Decem- 
ber 1980, and zero otherwiseis  expected to have a negative coefficient. 
Equalization Period. The equalization legislation was a fundamental shift in Cali- 
fornia dairy policy. The legislative action reflected that equality among producers 
would not be achieved through natural growth in milk consumption. For years to 
come, the quota program would have producers who benefitted differently from the 
program because of their quota ownership; thus, the change created the potential for 
political strife among dairy producers. Also, the change reduced the flow return per 
unit of quota relative to the  past. Additional quota in the system meant lower per unit 
returns by raising the ratio of quota-to-milk sales. The variable Equalization Period 
equals one beginning July 1978 through December 1998, and zero otherwise. We 
believe the effect persisted until the end of the data period because the fundamental 
policy concern and differential quota ownership were never fully corrected. Thus, the 
coefficient on Equalization Period is hypothesized to be negative. 
Dairy Termination. After several years of financial stress, the federal government 
paid producers to leave the dairy industry under the Dairy Termination Program, in 
effect from April 1986 through September 1987. The period of this policy event was 
selected as an explanatory variable because it provides a clear beginning and ending 
of a policy reflecting a fundamental change in the approach of USDA to dairy policy. 
The Dairy Termination variable equals one for the months April 1986 through 
September 1987, and zero otherwise. During the 18-month  period of the Dairy Termin- 
ation Program, more dairy producers sold quota than in any other comparable period. 
We expect the program lowered the quota price because of the additional volume of 
quota on the market from producers leaving the industry. For these reasons, the 
coefficient on Dairy Termination is predicted to be negative. 
Fixed Differential.  In 1994, after several months of erratic flow returns, the Cali- 
fornia Legislature fmed the flow return to quota by fixing the differential between 
quota milk and overbase milk. Fixed Differential equals one from January 1994 (the 
beginning of the policy) through December 1998 (the end of  the data set), and zero 
otherwise. Producers stated in interviews they believed this event signaled other 
policy changes. Some in the industry have argued that fixing the differential made Wilson and Sumner  Policy Risk in Dairy Quota  9 
the differential more transparent, and therefore easier to reduce in the future. Fixing 
the differential held monthly returns to quota fxed,  while milk total revenue varied 
even more. A negative coefficient is hypothesized. 
Description of Data 
The data used for the statistical analysis consisted of  348 monthly observations from 
January 1970 through December 1998  (CDFA, Milk Pooling Branch).  Although data  were 
available for the initial months August 1969  through December 1969,  these observations 
were omitted because these months represented the introductory period of  the market. 
During the introductory period, the monthly price of  quota was extremely  volatile, with 
price swings of  more than 100%. 
All of  the quota prices were deflated by the In&x  of Prices Paid by Farmers, Items 
Used for Production (1992 = 100). This index was used because it reflects the value of 
other assets besides quota that  producers purchase or invest. After deflating, each series 
was checked for unit roots and none were found. (All time-series analyses of the data are 
available from the authors upon request.) For each series, the means and standard devi- 
ations are presented in table l. 
Model Specification for Expectations 
and Functional Form 
The dependent variable Quota Price is the deflated average price of  the quota trans- 
actions made during the month. The Quota Price was deflated by the Index of Prices 
Paid by Farmers, Items Used for Production. As reported in table 1,  the mean for Quota 
Price was $436.55 (in 1992 dollars per pound of  snf quota), with a standard deviation 
of  $138.78. Figure 1  shows the Quota Price rose initially, then fell below its initial level 
in 1975, and fell again in 1978. Quota Price was fairly constant after 1978, until it fell 
again in 1995. 
From discussions with dairy producers, we knew they valued quota by examining 
quota prices during recent months, but the producers did not agree on the number of 
previous months used in their valuation (see Wilson, 1999).  Therefore, time-series 
analysis was used to describe Quota Price. Using an autoregressive time-series model, 
it was determined  that, on average, lags of  two months contained the information needed 
to identify the current Quota Price. 
The model, as suggested earlier, is built on expectations of the flow return and other 
variables, specifically policy shifts. To incorporate expectations  into the model, we used 
the adaptive expectations  model. Recognizing the two-month lag process of the depend- 
ent variable, the second-order adaptive expectations [AE(2)1  model was selected. This 
lag structure is consistent  with the responses from producers and the time-series model. 
Additionally, the AE(2) model provides a more complex expectation mechanism relative 
to the AE(1)  model, and the AE(2) model nests the AE(1) model. In the AE(2) model, the 
expectations variable is written as follows: 10  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation 
c---  1992  $llb.  snf - -  -> 
Quota Price  436.55  138.78 
Flow Return  7.45  3.59 
Liquidity  0.10  0.13 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation 
<-  -  -  - - - Ratio -  -  - -  -  -> 
Fatlsnf  0.41  0.012 
Base /Quota  1.04  0.110 
where Ai  Ii = 1  and 2) is the AE(2)  parameter, L is the lag operator, and x, is the observed 
value from which producers form  expectation^.^ 
Imposing the autoregressive  form of  a linear regression on the AE(2)  model generates 
an order two autoregressive error process AR(2), expressed as follows: 
where v,  = E,  - (A1 + A2)ct-,  + (AlA2)&,-,. 
In the AE(2) model, if the error term E,  has autoregressive terms and if the parameters 
of  those autoregressive terms are equal to the coefficients on the moving average error 
terms, then the autoregressive and moving average terms cancel, leaving white noise. 
In this case, 
where p,  = (A1 + A2), and p,  = -(A,A,),  so that 
(10)  yt = (1  -  (A,  + A2)  + A1A2)a + P(1 -  A,)(l  - A2)xt 
+ (a1 + 3L2)~t-l  - (3L13L2)Yt-2  + Ut' 
where u,-N(0, oit).  This result also holds in the case where the equality of  the rhos is 
approximate. If the error term in equation (9) did not have an autoregressive process 
which at  least approximately cancelled out the moving average component, estimation 
of  equation (10)  without the moving average components would generate a serially corre- 
lated error term. Assuming equality of the autoregressive terms, we then tested for serial 
correlation of  the first, second, and third orders with the Breusch-Godfrey test. The null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation could not be rejected, providing support for the equal- 
ity of the autoregressive terms. Under these conditions, estimating equation (10)  as an 
OLS model generates best linear unbiased estimates, which are also asymptotically 
efficient. 
To  simplify exposition, equations (8) and (10) above included only one explanatory 
variable. In the empirical model here, several  explanatory  variables are  included. There- 
%e  parameterization of the AE(2) model was based on the suggestion of Arthur Havenner. Wilson and Sumner  Policy Risk in Dairy Quota  11 
fore, we replaced P(1- Al)(l - A,)x,  with Xi Pi(l -  Al)C1 - A2)xit,  where xi, represents one 
of  the explanatory variables. This model is specified as  follow^:^ 
(11)  Quota Price, = a*  + P;(Flow Return,) + P;(Liquidity,)  + P;(Fatlsnf,) 
+  (BaselQuota,  1 + Pi  (Rising Price Support,) 
+ Pi  (Equalization Shock,  1 +  (Equalization Period,) 
+ Pi(Dairy Termination,) + Pi(Fixed Differential,) 
where a*  = (1  -  (A1  + A,)  + A1A2)a; P:  = Pi(l -  A1)(l  -  A2); @;  = (a1  + A,);  and @;  = -(a1a2). 
Parameter Estimates 
We present two models of Quota Price regressed on combinations  of the independent var- 
iables described in the previous section (see table 2). Model 1  is Quota Price regressed 
on two lags of the Quota Price, Flow Return, Liquidity Fatlsnf, and BaselQuota. Model 
2 is Model 1  with the event dummies added as explanatory  variable^.^ 
Our discussion focuses on Model 2, which includes the policy event variables. As seen 
from table 2, the coefficient @,  on Quota Price,_, is 0.54. The coefficient @,  on Quota 
Price,_, is 0.35. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% alpha level. The statistical 
significance of Quota Price,_,  provides support of the AE(2) model versus the AE(1) 
model. The roots of  the lag polynomial are -2.62 and 1.09, both outside the unit circle. 
Thus, the model is stationary (Nelson, 1973). 
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables provide estimates of  A,  and A,  from 




@,  = 0.53 = (A,  + A,) 
4,  = 0.35 = -(a1a2) 
generates the solutions (A1, A,)  = (0.91, -0.38). 
The adaptive expectations model generates estimates of long-run and short-run 
effects. The estimated coefficient on each of  the explanatory variables xi, of  the AE(2) 
model is Pi(l - A1)(l  - A,),  which is also the short-run effect of a change in xi, on Quota 
Price. The effect of  a sustained change of  xi, on Quota Price is the long-run effect or 
steady-state multiplier. The long-run effect assumes that {xi,  =  = xi,-, = ...  ). In terms 
of the lag operator, the long-run effect is equivalent to setting the lag operator equal to 
one (or turning off the lag operator). Therefore, the long-run multiplier is defined as: 
The functional form here can be viewed as a first-order approximation  of the complex nonlinear model which would be 
more tightly co~ected  to the single present value model in equation (5).  While other functional forms are possible, the model 
of equation (11)  generated economically reasonable estimates of the parameters that fit the data well. 
We  also examined two additional models to test the robustness of the estimates. In the first model, Quota Price was 
regressed against two lags of the Quota Price and Flow Return. In the second model, Liquidity was added to the previous 
model. The variables in all four models had similar parameter estimates, suggesting the robustness  of the specitication. The 
estimates are available from the authors upon request. 12  April2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Regression of Quota  Price on Quota Market Factors (in  1992 dollars) 
Variable 
MODEL 1  MODEL  2 





Rising Price Support (Jan. 74-Dec.  81) 
Equalization Shock (July 78-Dec.  80) 
Equalization Period (July 78-Dec.  98) 
Dairy Termination (Apr. 86-Sep. 87) 





No. of Observations 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*) denote signiticance  at  the lo%, 5%,  and 1% alpha levels, respectively. The 
statistical significance is based on a two-tailed t-test except for the five policy event dummy variables (Rising Price 
Support,  Equalization Shock,  Equalization Period, Dairy Termination, and Fixed Differential) which are based on a one- 
tailed test. 
The long-run impact of a change in xi,  on y,  assumes a permanent change in xi,  is observ- 
able; however, one cannot observe a permanent change in xi,.  As a proxy for a long-run 
change in  xi,,  we used the  change inx, over the  time horizon of the  data set. This method 
was useful as a measure of the relative long-run contributions of each of the factors on 
Quota Price. 
Results 
Now, turn to the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The coefficient on Flow 
Return is positive and significant at  the 5%  level. The positive sign is in accord with a 
net present value model of  an asset generating a flow of benefits. The short-run coeffi- 
cient is 1.59 with an  elasticity of  0.03.  The long-run coefficient is 13.30 and significant 
at  the 5%  level with an elasticity of 0.23  (see table 3).  An increase in monthly expected 
Flow Return by $1  in the long run would have generated an increase in Quota Price of 
$13.30.  Evaluated at the mean, a long-run Flow Return increase of  10%  would have 
increased Quota Price by 2.3%. 
From January 1970 through December 1998,  Flow Return fell by 69.74%  in 1992 
dollars. Using the long-run elasticity of  0.23,  the  69.74% decline in Flow Return implies 
the Quota Price fell by 16.04%,  ceteris paribus. Quota Price actually fell by 37.64% over 
the 29-year study period. Thus, the decline in Flow Return accounts for a substantial 
share of the long-run change in Quota Price.' 
'  Because the estimates are linear approximations of the nonlinear present value model, we are not able to calculate the 
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Table 3. Multiplier and Elasticities at the Mean (Model 2) 
Short-Run  Short-Run  Long-Run  Long-Run 
Variable  Effect "  Elasticity  Effecta  Elasticity 
Flow Return 
Liquidity 
Fat  lsnf 
Base /Quota  42.95**  0.10  358.60***  0.85 
(16.89)  (141.00) 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*)denote  significance  at  the lo%,  5%, and 1%  alpha levels, respectively, 
based on a two-tailed t-test. Values in parentheses are standard errors for the short-run effects and asymptotic 
standard errors based on linear approximations for the long-run effects (Greene, 1993). 
"The short-run effect is the estimated coefficient from the OLS regression (Model 2). The long-run effect is: 
Short-Run Effect  =  Short-Run Effect 
P(~ongRm)  = 
1 - 4  - 4)  (1  - 0.54 - 0.35) ' 
The coefficients on Liquidity, Fatlsnf, and BaselQuota are statistically significant at 
the 1%  or 5%  levels. Though these variables are  statistically significant, the impact of each 
is  relatively small when considering the short- and long-run elasticities and the standard 
deviations of the variables. The response to Liquidity is extremely inelastic (table 3). 
Given the  average month-to-month  variation of 158%,  the  short-run effect ofLiquidity was 
only about 1.11%. Long-run effects are  hard to determine because the dependent variable 
fluctuated around its mean with no noticeable trend. The quota quality variables had 
small effects on the quota price. Fatlsnf had a month-to-month variation of 3%, resulting 
in a short-run effect of only 1.53% (in absolute value). Fatlsnf declined about 0.5%, giving 
a long-run effect of a 2.12% increase in Quota Price. Similarly,  BaselQuota had a short-run 
effect on Quota Price of  0.94% given the month-to-month variation of  9.42%. However, 
BaselQuota fell by about 12%,  which led to a 10.2% decline in Quota Price. 
From these results, most of the  occasional and sustained changes in Quota Price come 
from Flow Return, Liquidity, Fatlsnf, and  BaselQuota. However, the econometric model 
provides some evidence that policy events negatively affected the quota price. The 
coefficients on four of the five policy event dummies (Equalization Period, Rising Price 
Support,  Dairy Termination, and  Fixed Differential) were negative (table 2). The 
coefficient on Equalization Shock was positive but statistically insignificant. Because 
the  coefficients  on the dummy variables are all hypothesized to be negative, a one-tailed 
test is used to assess their significance. In Model 2, Rising Price Support,  Equalization 
Period, and Fixed Differential have statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 
10%  levels, respectively. 
The fact that  Rising Price Support is statistically significant indicates the federal 
policy had an  influence on California dairy producers. Holding constant the  possible 
changes in Flow Return that  the policies under Rising Price Support may have had, 
Rising Price Support causes Quota Price to fall by $13.651113.  snf. This change is about 
3% of average Quota Price. 
The largest coefficient of the policy event dummies (in absolute value) was for the 
period after equalization. One implication of the influence of Equalization Period was 14  April 2004  Journal ofAgricultura1  and Resource Economics 
that the quota program appeared to be failing; yet, the policy continues today. The 
uncertainty experienced in this period generated a decline in Quota Price of $18.56/1b. 
snf, or more than 5% of  average Quota Price during that period. The impact of Fixed 
Differential compared to other statistically significant policy event variables is small. 
This result  is not  surprising given  differing opinions of  the effect of  this policy: 
stabilizing the flow return or f~ng  the flow return to phase it  out over time. The Fixed 
Differential causes a decline in Quota Price of  $7.931113. snf, which is a 2.5% fall in the 
average Quota Price over that period. As  with Fixed Differential, we now believe the 
periods oftime specified a priori for Equalization Shock and Dairy Termination were too 
short to capture the full effects of the policy changes on Quota Price. This may explain 
why the result was statistically insignificant. 
Changes in policies induced an industrywide shift in the perceptions of  producers 
about the future of dairy policies in California. Overall, even with the difficulty of 
specifying the precise dates for the influence of the policy event variables, significant 
effects are found in the direction hypothesized, supporting the notion of policy default 
risk. 
Summary and Implications 
Overall, the regression results were reasonable, and the estimated values track the data 
well. The second-order adaptive expectations model seemed to be a sensible choice in 
modeling the market price of  quota, especially given the significant coefficient on the 
second lag. The regression showed the importance of  expected Flow Return in deter- 
mining Quota Price. The coefficient on Liquidity suggests the market for quota has 
experienced significant  liquidity constraints and that  the quota market responded to the 
short-term financial conditions of producers. The statistical significance of Fatlsnf and 
BaselQuota supports the relevance of  specific characteristics of quota sold each month 
on Quota Price. Finally, the significance of  the dummy variables of policy events 
confirms various adverse policy events have lowered the quota price over time relative 
to the expected quota flow returns, which were based on past data alone. Clearly, the 
major influence on the variation of  the quota price was the historical variation in 
monthly flow of net benefits from owning quota, but policy events also have negatively 
affected the value of  quota. Hence, the rate of  return to quota rises in periods of policy 
uncertainty. Additionally, the results show that features of  the policy, such as restric- 
tions on ownership of  quota and historical allocations, contributed to a lower Quota 
Price, and thus the increase in the rate of return to quota. Based on these findings, the 
risk of policy default, and other features of the policy, affected the price of quota and the 
wealth of  California dairy producers. 
In the context of  pressure to reform or eliminate agricultural policy, understanding 
the wealth effects of agricultural policy is key. One of the most complicated elements in 
the debates to eliminate peanut and tobacco quota has been the value to assign these 
policy-created assets. 
[Received June 2003;$nal  revision received November 2003.1 Wilson and Sumner 
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